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Suicide and Death
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Abstract
Did Michel Foucault die of AIDS or did he kill himself? Did he
knowingly infect others in the bath houses in San Francisco or
was he unaware that he was ill and of how less-than-safe sex
could spread the same virus that infected him? What did he
know about AIDS/HIV and what do we know about what he
knew? Answers to these questions are ambiguous. This is due,
in part, to the culture of homosexuality and the cultural
response to AIDS/HIV at the time. It is also due to the
conflicting reports about what Foucault knew, and when, in the
press, in biographies and in a roman á clef that claims to tell
the truth about Foucault in fiction. What are the facts in this
case and where do we find them? This essay explores how
facts became fiction and fiction became fact in the life and
death of Michel Foucault.
Key Words
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death
1. Reports of Foucault's Death
In December 1983, I had an invitation to meet socially with
Michel Foucault at the apartment in San Francisco he was
renting while teaching what had become an annual schedule of
seminars for the French Department at the University of
California at Berkeley. The invitation was not addressed to me
personally. It was arranged by a friend, Joseph Pearson, who
was tape-recording Foucault's seminar that semester and
meeting with Foucault to clarify details he had captured on
tape.[1] I was not then (or am I now) overwhelmed by
Foucault's notoriety; having audited the seminar, however, I
was curious and so sincerely disappointed when Foucault
canceled at the last moment because he was feeling ill. It was
not apparent then that there was anything more to think
about it. Within a week, Foucault returned to Paris; six months
later, he was dead.
At that time, we did not have the instant access to the French
press the internet affords us today. First-hand information
came from obituaries published in the San Francisco Chronicle
and the New York Times.[2] The original reports about the
cause of death were ambiguous and contradictory. This was
seriously frustrating. What had caused Foucault to die
apparently so suddenly and prematurely? Was it really AIDS?
Foucault's fondness for San Francisco bath houses was widely
discussed at the time. What we knew about AIDS, however,
was not entirely clear. Nor was it clear what exactly was at
stake in thinking AIDS was the cause of Foucault's death. In
1984, it was possible (it still seems plausible, today) to believe
in an AIDS conspiracy, in campaigns of disinformation
disseminating news about the "gay plague," and in a practiced
neglect of AIDS cases because they were reported by
homosexuals. [3] If Foucault had died of AIDS, would it be
used to support this conspiracy and to intensify the animosity
toward homosexuals in general? Would it be used to discredit
Foucault himself, the way syphilis was used to discredit
Nietzsche? If Foucault had died of AIDS, had it been the result
of neglect or of a will to ignorance about an illness striking
down gay men? How much had Foucault known about AIDS
and about his own illness? Had he wanted to die? Had he
endangered the lives of others?
The reports from the French papers, when they arrived a week
later, did little to answer these questions. Buried in the
eulogies that filled the pages of Le Monde, 27 June, two days
after Foucault's death, a small, unsigned column, titled "Le
communiqué des médecins," declared the following:
M. Michel Foucault entered the clinic for maladies
of the nervous system at the hospital of the
Salpétriére in Paris, 9 June 1984, for further
examinations made necessary by the
manifestation of neurological events complicating
a septicemic state. These examinations revealed
the existence of several areas of cerebral
suppuration. Antibiotic treatment, at first, had a
favorable effect; last week, a remission permitted
M. Michel Foucault to take notice of the first
reviews following on the publication of his last
books. An abrupt worsening dashed all hope of
effective therapy, and death came 25 June at
1:15 p.m.
The statement, seemingly authoritative, issued by the doctors
at the Salpétriére with the agreement of Foucault's family, was
the apparent basis for the reports in the English language
papers in the days and weeks that followed. That same day,
27 June, a reporter in Paris writing for the London Guardian
gave the cause of death as "a rare brain infection." An obituary
in the London Times, also 27 June, avoided all mention of the
cause of Foucault's death. The notice in the New York Times,
that same day, said something about a neurological disorder
but concluded by saying "the cause of death was not
immediately disclosed." Two weeks after the fact, on 9 July
1984, Time magazine would report that Foucault had died of
cancer. Unless this designation was a concealed and
abbreviated reference to "homosexuals' cancer," as the
disease was sometimes called then, there was no mention of
AIDS in the official account of the cause of Foucault's death.
Of course, this apparently official and obviously ambiguous
account did little to settle the matter. Already, by 27 June, an
unsigned letter to the quotidian Libération gave the failure to
name a determinate cause in the case an unfortunate cast.
As soon as he died, rumors began to circulate. It
is being said that Foucault died of AIDS. As
though an exceptional intellectual seemed,
because he was also homosexual an ideal target
for the fashionable disease. As though Foucault
had to die shamefully.[4]
What disturbed people about this letter was not the voice
given to the rumors about what is now widely believed, but
still not known, to be the cause of Foucault's death. It was,
rather, the association of AIDS with shame, especially in a
paper Foucault had helped to found and whose personal
columns Foucault once described as "an erotic stage on which
anyone can inscribe themselves and wander around, even if
they are not looking for anything, even if they expect
nothing."[5] There could be no shame associated with
homosexuality in Foucault's case. What the sentiment in the
letter nonetheless faithfully records is the anxiety and the
uncertainty about the exact cause of Foucault's death.
That anxiety was only heightened, well after the fact and
rather indirectly, in Daniel Defert's endorsement of an
interview given by one of his associates, Jean le Bitoux, with a
gay American weekly in early 1986 confirming that Foucault
had died of AIDS. Le Bitoux had collaborated with Defert,
Foucault's lover and companion, at Association AIDES which
was founded in Foucault's memory "to confront this disease,
which he had caught."[6] Nothing was presented to support le
Bitoux's statement but Defert's supposed endorsement. In
what sense, then, can it be counted as the truth? How do the
claims of this statement stand up against the truth of the
statement by the Salpétriére? And how are we supposed to
negotiate these facts, truths representing the discursive
regimes of competing institutions -- the hospital, the gay press
-- and their claims on the life of Michel Foucault? Is it possible
to discover the objective facts in this case and use them to
identify the fiction constructed to protect the family, in the one
instance, or canonize a gay saint, in the other?
2. Language and Facts in the Death of Foucault
The question is not trivial. It implicates the general philosophy
of language in Foucault that is in the background of the finer
distinctions between fact and fiction, suicide and death
explored in what follows here. In The Archaeology of
Knowledge, Foucault distinguishes statements from the
grammatical formation of sentences, the logical formation of
propositions and the performative formation of speech acts.[7]
Unlike these other linguistic units, a statement is a function
isolatable only "in its actual practice, its conditions, the rules
that govern it, and the field in which it operates."[8] There are
statements where there are none of the grammatical
structures that form a sentence, however loosely defined.
Classificatory tables, a genealogical tree, an accounts book,
the calculations of a trade balance, all contain statements but
no sentences. The letters A Z E R T in a French typewriting
manual function as a statement but do not form a sentence.
Likewise, different arrangements of words that constitute the
same proposition ("No one heard" and "It is true that no one
heard") do not form the same statement because, by virtue of
being linked with different discursive fields (the first in the
voice of the author or a character in the text the second as
part of an interior monologue or in a group of questions and
answers), they function differently and are governed by
different rules.
Finally, a single speech act, an oath, for example, may be
composed of several statements. The decree, "I now
pronounce you husband and wife," is indistinguishable as a
speech act from the decree, "I now pronounce you man and
wife," but these are two different and distinct statements,
functioning to unite two people in marriage on different terms
and confirming that more than one statement is functioning in
those decrees. The issue introduced above and followed
through in the discussion that continues below is to what
discursive regime — medical reports, news stories, gossip,
biography, commentary philosophy, fiction — do the
statements about Foucault's life and death belong and what do
the actual practices, conditions and rules that govern these
fields (what Foucault calls, collectively, the "enunciative
modalities" of the statement) lend to the truth claimed in
these statements. What are we to think if the enunciative
modalities of science, journalism and biography prove
inadequate to a task better served by philosophical
speculation, hearsay and fiction?
Didier Eribon, Foucault's French biographer, reports that in the
winter before his death Foucault had phoned Georges Dumézil
and said, "I think I have AIDS."[9] Eribon concludes from this
that Foucault knew but did not want to know, that he knew
but did not want to burden his friends with what he did not
want to know, that this confidence shared with the eighty-six-
year-old man who had been his "director of conscience" for so
many years says as much.[10] He goes on to publish the
remarks of Paul Veynes, a friend and colleague, about a
conversation with Foucault in February 1984. Foucault had
been suffering with a fever and a dry cough he could not
shake. Veynes said to him, jokingly, "Your doctors are bound
to think you have AIDS." "That is exactly what they think,"
Foucault replied. "I realized it from the questions they asked
me." After recommending that his friend get some rest by
taking a break from all the Greek and Latin he had been
reading, Veynes asked Foucault, incidentally, whether he
thought AIDS was real or just a legend with a moral. "Well,"
Foucault told him, "I've studied the matter closely, I've read a
lot about it. Yes, it exists. It isn't a legend." And Veynes says
he went on to give precise pathogenic details of the
illness.[11] Veynes suspected, then, only that an historian of
medicine had been keeping up with the news from American
sources. "In retrospect," he says, "his cool headedness over
my stupid question takes my breath away."[12]
Beyond this anecdotal evidence, David Macey, Foucault's
British biographer, recommends the following inferences.[13]
In retrospect, one can only wonder at the
rumors, now that the references in obituaries to
Arare brain infection and Aneurological disorders
are as obviously transparent metaphors for AIDS-
related conditions as Aa long illness bravely
borne is for cancer. The symptoms displayed by
Foucault in the eighteen months or so before his
death now seem to be particularly clear: flu-like
symptoms, headaches, severe loss of weight,
recurrent bouts of fever and a persistent dry
cough.
Presented together, today, these indications would be clear
signs of HIV infection. At the time of Foucault's death,
however, these symptoms did not so obviously add up; and
there was no test for AIDS then, no medical means for
extracting from these signs the facts that could lead to a
definite diagnosis. It is still, today, not clear whether or what
Foucault or his doctors knew about the illness that killed him.
There remains just the official statement, approved by the
family and reported by the doctors -- septicemia and
suppuration, infection and discharge in the brain -- and the
unofficial statement, approved by Daniel Defert and reported
in a paper edited for a gay audience -- AIDS. The biographies
by Eribon and Macey give us grounds for questioning the
hospital report but not enough evidence for confirming the
report in the Advocate. To make a stronger case for Defert's
indirect confession, we have to turn to the work of Foucault's
American biographer, James Miller.
3. Fact and Fiction in the Life of Foucault
Miller adds nothing to the facts known about Foucault's death.
Miller's contribution is distinctive, rather, for the way it
attempts to integrate Foucault's philosophy into a story that
interprets what is known about Foucault's life into a fantastic
narrative about his death. Drawing from Foucault's
commentary on Bataille, Miller describes death as a "limit-
experience" in Foucault's life and death by AIDS as a
distinctive feature of Foucault's experience of that particular
limit. In support of this morbid diagnosis, Miller paints a lurid
picture of a man obsessed by death and drugs, suicide and
sadomasochistic sex which Foucault is described as seeking
right up until his death in the bath houses in New York and
San Francisco. He quotes from an interview Foucault gave for
the inaugural issue of Gai Pied in 1979, and from another
interview given in 1983 (and published that year in Sécurité
social: l'enjeu) extolling the virtues and pleasures of suicide.
According to Miller, Foucault insisted that "dying is sensuous
(just as Sade, for one, had said)" and, in those interviews,
Foucault described death as the "formless form of an
absolutely simple pleasure," a Alimitless pleasure whose
patient preparation, with neither rest nor predetermination,
will illuminate the entirety of your life."[14] In the absence of
any hard evidence about the circumstances leading to
Foucault's death, Miller tells a story that leads his readers to
conclude that Foucault knew he had AIDS, knew it was
potentially fatal and knowingly returned to those sites where
the illness was spreading.
Miller's story is compelling and disturbing, in part, because it
has compelled some otherwise careful readers to endorse
it.[15] What those readers are ready to endorse is precisely
the story Miller tells that connects facts about Foucault's life
with features of Foucault's thought. This story is, alternatively,
thought to be the imposition of a unifying principle on the life
of a man who argued vigorously against the demands of
personal identity. "Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to
remain the same," Foucault famously wrote: "leave it to our
bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in
order."[16] In comparison with the detail of Eribon and Macey,
Miller's fashioning of an identity for Foucault out of his
preoccupations with death seems a welcome departure from
bureaucracy and the police. On the other hand, the salacious
casting of these preoccupations in the context of Foucault's
homosexual encounters will seem to some to be introduced to
promote the author's book rather than an unflinching look at a
dark side of things the subject of the book was fond of
exposing in his genealogies. At what point does Miller's
account depart from the facts for the purposes of telling a
good fiction? Even if Foucault might endorse this kind of
fiction, how much can it help us to understand the facts about
Foucault's death?
We ordinarily distinguish fact from fiction by the
correspondence or lack of a correspondence between what is
stated and a reference in the world. Factual statements give
evidence in support of a claim about this referent that can be
tested by third parties. Fictional statements make claims as
the basis for further fictional statements that can be tested
only in the context of those same claims. In the case
fashioned in these pages, the official certificate of death, the
report in the Advocate, and the biographies by Eribon and
Macey all make claims about Foucault's life and death based
on evidence presented or implied in their various statements.
Miller's biography, it is supposed, slouches toward fiction
because of the misleading evidence it presents and because
the "truth" of its claims about the life and death of Foucault
depends primarily on the coherence and reflexivity of those
same claims. Apart from confirming what so many suspect to
be the facts about Foucault's death, is there any reason for
taking Miller's account seriously? Well, there is, if we consider
what Foucault himself had to say about the relation between
facts and fiction.
4. Semiotics; Hermeneutics; Commentary
In Les mots et les choses, the book that made him famous in
France,[17] Foucault argues, in part, that the problem of
reference is not a contemporary philosophical abstraction or a
paradox contained in language but one result of a long process
in the course of which words have become steadily separated
from things. Until the end of the 16th century, Foucault says,
words were intimately interwoven with things and language
was not an abstraction but a thing in the world found written
in the signatures that linked one thing with another in an
indefinite network of resemblances. Thus, for the Renaissance
mind, wounds to the pericranium were thought to be cured by
the thick green rind covering the fruit of the walnut, while
internal head ailments were treated with the fruit itself "which
is exactly like the brain in appearance."[18]
In this period, then, the semiology that locates and specifies
signs and their relation to one another and the hermeneutics
that interprets these signs and discovers their meaning
seamlessly overlap -- to infinity. For the signature on the
walnut that indicates its resemblance to the pericranium also
resembles the covering on other nuts, by virtue of which we
identify the general class of fruits to which the walnut belongs,
and these are called fruits by virtue of containing something
nourishing within a protective covering, from which similitude
the fetus is called "fruit of the womb" and the semen is
thought to be a seed. And in the other direction, the skull and
the brain, for which the rind and fruit of the walnut were
thought to provide a remedy, by its position atop the body,
were known to be the superior part of a human being just as
the sun which is highest in the sky is superior to all the forms
of life that it nourishes. A sign of the superiority of that brain
is the light its eyes shine on these similitudes which resembles
the light of the sun, and so on. Since so much is signed in
what is written on the surfaces of things, interpretation was
charged with divining the relevant or salient secret of that
thing and, thus, a certain divination and magic came to inform
knowledge.
And the same is to be said, following this archaeology of the
Renaissance, about the semiology and hermeneutics of all the
texts of Scripture and of the sages handed down and
preserved for us from antiquity. The pages of these ancient
texts are so many seas of sign, and the task in reading them is
the same: to make the signs speak. But there is an added
wrinkle, a folding of the signs marking those pages, as words,
onto the natural world of things those words reflect, and a
folding of these words onto the signs marking the pages of
other texts. The first fold resulted in complex "legends," such
as the Renaissance naturalist Aldrovandi's catalogue of
serpents according to their equivocations (the various
meanings of the word 'serpent'), synonyms and etymologies,
differences, form and description, anatomy, nature and habits,
temperament, coitus and generation, voice, movements,
places, diet, etc.
The second fold results in a different kind of encyclopedia. The
Materia Medica, for example, collects certain divinations of the
secrets of flora identified as herbs. To read it, we must learn
its language by identifying its signs and the relations linking
those signs to others similar to them. To understand it, we
must understand its resemblances to other texts of the same
or analogous or sympathetic or convenient sorts (other books
on herbs or on humors of the body or on homeopathic
remedies that incorporate herbs or books sharing the same
shelf). Reading a book and reading nature are species of the
same thing and, in the Renaissance, Foucault says, both are
coeval with the institution of God.[19]
Of course, it's ever more complicated than that. Leaving aside
the difficulties posed by the many different natural languages
that translate the language written on the surface of nature,
there is the emergence at the end of the 16th century of
special species of commentary, the iteration and indefinite
proliferation of a language devoted to making texts speak.
Where the texts of the ancient sages reflected on the
resemblances in nature and the resemblances mirrored in the
signs written on the pages of a text, commentary as it
emerged at the end of the Renaissance (and that persists to
this day) sought to represent the truth of the written text by
interpreting the meaning hidden in it once and for all. From
the density of resemblances inscribed on every page of a text,
commentary sought to isolate and interpret the most salient
similitudes of that text. As a standard for evaluating salience,
commentary invented a sovereign text hidden in the text that
is its foundation and justification, its ideal limit and, yet, at the
same time, its ceaselessly animating force. The sovereign text
is the secret of commentary: without it, commentary has no
point, with it commentary breaks its reference to the world of
things. With commentary, the epistemic conditions of
resemblance have been supplanted by representation and, as
Montaigne observed, "there is more work in interpreting
interpretations than in interpreting things: and more books on
books than on any other subject; we do nothing but write
glosses on one another."[20] Foucault sums up the situation
as follows.
The profound kinship of language with the world
was thus dissolved. The primacy of the written
word went into abeyance. And that uniform layer,
in which the seen and the read, the visible and
the expressible, were endlessly interwoven,
vanished too. Things and words were to be
separated from one anotherY. Discourse was still
to have the task of speaking that which is, but it
[what is] was no longer to be anything more than
what is said.[21]
The only thing, Foucault says, that still today recalls the
richness of that indefinite network of similitudes, a world
characterized by the attractions of signs to other signs, and
not a world constructed to support significations that can only
be represented in another order of signs, the only place where
we find a memory of the Renaissance episteme, is in literature.
Where commentary announced the becoming discourse of
language, Foucault says, literature preserved the "living being
of language," an "autonomous existence of language," a
"counter-discourse."[22] But while language in the
Renaissance was limited by its intimacy with things, language
in literature, born with modernity in the 17th century, "was to
grow with no point of departure, no end, and no promise."[23]
Where commentary supposed a hidden text as the foundation
and justification of its discourse, literature offered no excuses
and no justifications for the worlds invented in its fictions. And
this, finally, is the point of this digression. Foucault's
biographers, Miller and Halperin included,[24] suppose there is
a secret that animates their accounts and animates the life
they attribute to their subject. Their facts and fictions are
ordered, more in the case of Eribon, Macey, and Halperin, less
in the case of Miller, by the discursive regularities of
biographies, to give Foucault a life like any other, a life that
barely touches, if it touches at all, on the life he lived, a life
that represents Foucault as a great man, as a hero, as
passionate, as a saint.
5. Fact and Fiction; Biography and Roman á Clef
On this reading, the argument could be made that Miller's
literary license moves the story about Foucault's life and death
in the right direction. Miller reveals the secret behind his
portrait of Foucault -- a death drive preoccupation with
suicide, drugs and sado-masochistic pleasure -- and breathes
life into his subject. Others had anticipated his example.
Maurice Blanchot wrote Michel Foucault as I Imagine Him, a
commentary of Foucault's work in light of a life Blanchot
imagined through that work.[25] And then there's the story
Hervé Guibert wrote, To the Friend Who Did Not Save My
Life,[26] a roman à clef Daniel Defert dismissed as a "vicious
fantasy,"[27] but which Miller, Macey, Eribon and Halperin all
say is likely based on Guibert's close personal relationship with
Foucault.[28] The novella is, in the main, a memoir of the
author's own infection with HIV and inevitable death from
AIDS in 2001. The friend of the title is, alternatively, the book
Guibert is writing and Bill, the manager of a large
pharmaceutical laboratory that manufactures vaccines. But the
friend in the novella that interests us is Muzil, a thinly veiled
portrait of Foucault.[29] Early in the book, in an early episode
described as taking place sometime in 1981, Muzil is described
as falling off the sofa with hysterical laughter at the prospect
of AIDS that the aforementioned Bill had reported to Guibert.
"A cancer that would hit only homosexuals," Muzil howls, "no,
that's too good to be true. I could just die laughing!"[30] "As it
happened," the author observes, "Muzil was already infected
with the retrovirus, since its latency period, as Stéphane told
me the other day, is now known to be about six years,
although this is being kept quiet to avoid spreading panic
among the thousands who are seropositive."[31] Stéphane is
Guibert's portrait of Foucault's long-time companion Daniel
Defert.
Guibert goes on to comment on Muzil's apparent depression in
the months following this laughing fit in response to the report
about the "homosexuals' cancer," clearly implying, to Guibert,
that Muzil suspected something, something secretly contained
in the admission "that he confided in no one but me."
Stéphane is sick with love of me. I finally
understand that I am Stéphane's sickness and
that I'll remain so all his life, no matter what I
do, unless I disappear; the only way to save him
from his illness, I'm sure of this, would be to do
away with myself."[32]
No wonder Defert despised this fiction. But how much of it was
true? And what was to be inferred from this "admission?" That
Foucault was already sick, or at least infected in 1981? Based
on what we know, now, about HIV and AIDS, it seems
possible. Did Foucault suspect as much? Based on what
Guibert has written, it seems probable. Can he have known or
known the implications of his illness: that his continued sexual
promiscuity, if he was infected, was a risk for his sexual
partners? Between 1981 and 1983, it seems unlikely. In the
first place, little was known, at that time, about the illness and
its pathogenesis. More importantly, the heterosexual
imagination that reduces male homosexual intimacy to
sodomy and fellatio and that inflates the frequency of
homosexual encounters to fill the paucity of heterosexual
sexual experience cannot imagine perverse pleasures that
would not include the exchange of bodily fluids. But as David
Halperin's portrait of Foucault and the S/M scenes he
frequented makes abundantly clear, straight fantasies of
homosexual acts had not begun to fathom the desexualization
of the male sex organ, the devaluation of orgasm or the
remapping of the body into zones of heretofore unexplored
sensations that was the staple of Foucault's and others' gaya
scienza, their gay science of pleasure.[33]
Guibert's fictional Stéphane discovers in Muzil's apartment,
after Muzil's death, "a huge bag filled with whips, leather
goods, leashes, bridles, and handcuffs."[34] According to
Guibert, Stéphane was repulsed by the discovery of this
paraphernalia which he claimed he did not know about. Yet
Guibert describes Muzil, and D.A. Miller describes Foucault, as
an enthusiastic participant in the San Francisco baths and the
hard-core scene there. Could Stéphane not have known about
the practices and sciences of pleasure in those baths and
Muzil's fondness for them?[35] Is Guibert inventing an
intimacy formed around his own fascination with the S/M
scene? In late autumn 1983, just after my missed tea with
Foucault, Guibert suggests to Muzil that the baths must be
empty because of the threat of AIDS. He has Muzil respond:
. . .it's just the opposite: the baths have never
been so popular, and now they're fantastic. This
danger lurking everywhere has created new
complicities, new tenderness, new solidarities.
Before, no one ever said a word; now we talk to
one another. We all know exactly why we are
there.[36]
If Guibert is to be believed, then, as early as 1981 and
certainly by 1983 Foucault was aware of the illness and of the
dangers represented by scenes of anonymous sexual
encounters, and he threw himself into these scenes anyway. If
he was not knowingly endangering the lives of others, was he
not at least endangering his own life? Was this a form a
suicide, a death he chose rather than a death that chose him?
This is the line, of course, running throughout James Miller's
controversial biography. It is what has infuriated so many
critics about the life he attributes to Foucault, leading some to
describe it as the worst sort of fiction, a tabloid account of
Foucault's homosexual experience to satisfy the heterosexual
imagination.[37] And, yet, we find some support for this
suggestion in a portrait of Foucault drawn by Gilles Deleuze,
for a long time one of Foucault's closest collaborators.[38] In
it, Deleuze discusses the direction of the research Foucault
followed in his last works, a direction that took him beyond
knowledge and power and the composites power/knowledge
formed. Deleuze describes this research as including
considerations of the Outside, taking the term from Blanchot
who uses it to mean "something more distant than any
external world" which is also "closer than any inner
world."[39] Thinking, Deleuze says, comes from this Outside,
and he refers, as a way of clarifying this metaphor of the line,
to Foucault's fascination, in The Birth of the Clinic, with
Bichat's conception of death.[40]
Bichat put forward what's probably the first
general modern conception of death, presenting it
as violent, plural, and coextensive with life.
Instead of taking it, like the classical thinkers, as
a point, he takes it as a line that we're constantly
confronting, and cross in either direction only at
the points where it ends.[41]
Passionate men cross the line, and "there's something of that
in Foucault's death," according to Deleuze. Beyond
power/knowledge there is, on this view, a third element for
Foucault, a new line represented in the research he conducted
in the last years of his life, "an acceleration," Deleuze calls it,
"that makes it impossible to distinguish death and
suicide."[42]
From this we might ascribe to Foucault not a morbid drive to
kill himself by becoming infected in the San Francisco baths
but rather a willingness to meet his death there, to cross the
line there, to invent his death in the company of the men and
boys with whom he had explored "the decentralization, the
regionalization of all pleasures."[43] That would preserve the
verisimilitude of the "fiction" in which Guibert tells the story
about meeting Muzil's secretary on a bus a few days after the
funeral. Asked whether Muzil knew what was killing him, the
assistant assures Guibert that Muzil knew that his illness would
prove fatal. Muzil had been attending meetings of the French
Doctors Without Borders at a dermatology clinic where the first
cases of AIDS (which manifests symptoms of Kaposi''s
sarcoma, reddish-violet blotches that spread all over the body)
were being treated. His persistent cough caught the attention
of the head of the clinic, and Muzil reluctantly agreed to tests.
"The head of the clinic was soon able to determine the nature
of Muzil's illness from the results of these tests," Guibert
writes,
but to safeguard the reputation of his patient and
colleague, he took steps to keep the truth from
leaking out by monitoring the medical records
and lab results linking that famous name to this
new disease, by falsifying and censoring this
paper trail so that Muzil could retain a free hand
with his work until his death, unencumbered by
troublesome rumors.[44]
Guibert goes on to say this unnamed head of dermatology
kept the information from Stéphane but not from this
secretary with whom he spoke after attempting to discuss the
test results with Muzil himself. According to the doctor, Muzil
had no patience for the details of the tests or the prognosis.
Instead, he "put an end to the discussion with an abrupt wave
of his hand, 'How long?' he'd asked."[45]
Is this story to be believed? Is this otherwise fictional account
of the last days of Foucault's life more or less credible than the
discursive details that write the facts of his death certificate?
According to the biographies, Foucault suspected he had AIDS
but never knew, did not want to know and did not want to
burden his friends with what he may or may not have known.
The suspicions, never confirmed, that his death was caused by
complications following from HIV infection led to the formation
of Association AIDES, the first organized body in France to
promote awareness about AIDS and to support research about
the illness: noble and generous ends suitably associated with,
by these accounts, a noble and generous man. In To the
Friend Who Did Not Save My Life, Stéphane tells Guibert at
lunch the day after Muzil dies that he learned for the first time
in the hospital registrar's office that the cause of death was
AIDS. Muzil's sister, who was with him,
demanded that they cross this out completely, or
scratch it out if they had to, or even better, tear
out the page and redo it, for while these records
are of course confidential, still, you never know,
perhaps in ten or twenty years some muckraking
biographer would come and Xerox the entry, or
X-ray the impression still faintly legible on the
next page.[46]
Do we read this fiction, now, as fact, because it confirms what
we otherwise suspect? Can we explain why Defert had called a
"vicious fantasy" the only source that could confirm the "truth"
he leaked to The Advocate? What facts and what fiction help
us to distinguish between brain hemorrhage and AIDS, suicide
and death in the life of Michel Foucault? Do we have any
reason to be disappointed by the apparent reliability of fiction
over the facts in this case?
Foucault, of course, had a special relation to fiction. "Foucault
liked to say that all his works were 'fictions'," Macey tells us,
"which did not necessarily mean," he goes on to explain, "that
they were untrue."[47] Foucault admitted to Claude Mauriac
that he had made fictional use of materials he assembled in his
books and made fictional constructions from authentic
elements.[48] And he told Raymond Bellour that Les mots et
les choses was "a 'fiction' pure and simple; it's a novel,"
Foucault said to him, "but I didn't make it up."[49] Macey
traces this notion of fiction back to Nietzsche and a passage
from Daybreak.[50]
Facta! Yes, facta ficat! A historian has to do, not
with what actually happened, but only with
events supposed to have happenedY.All historians
speak of things which have never existed except
in imagination.[51]
Macey uses this reference to endorse Guibert's novel which he
speculates Foucault would have preferred to the biography he
has written. It abbreviates, in Nietzsche's inimitable way, the
detailed argument for the preference, not to say the privilege,
of fiction over fact presented in Les mot et les choses. In
literature, Foucault says, words, otherwise burdened with
representing the truth, bring a world back to life. In fiction,
according to Nietzsche, we find facts that make our own lives
worth living. In the best case, no doubt, a story like the one
I've just told complicates the facts about Foucault's death and,
quite provisionally, to be sure, brings Foucault back to life
again. As the story finally ends, I can only hope that whatever
fiction it contains will have made our own lives worth living.
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